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THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AIR FARES
AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THEIR CONTROL
By LUCILE SHEPPARD KEYESt
I.

INTRODUCTION

N April 1963, after the first comprehensive review of this country's
international air transport policy since it took shape in the mid-1940's,
the President of the United States gave his endorsement to a Statement
which sets forth the basic principles and attitudes governing our present
official policy in this field.1 With respect to rates and rate-making, this
Statement reads as follows:
International air transport rates are now recommended by the carriers,
acting through their organization, known as the International Air Transport
Association (IATA), and approved by the governments concerned. This
multilateral mechanism, though it has some drawbacks, seems to be the most
practical one we can achieve, and it should be maintained. We cannot, however, abdicate our responsibility to protect the traveller and the shipper; we
will continue to press for rates we consider reasonable. To provide for more

effective governmental influence on rates, Congress should adopt legislation
which would give to the Civil Aeronautics Board authority, subject to approval by the President, to control rates in international air transport to and
from the United States.
Our efforts to secure reasonable rates can also be furthered by direct gov-

ernment-to-government discussions, initiated by the United States, concerning general rate levels; by continued United States support of practicable
means which help to achieve reasonable rates, such as charter services; and by
disapproving recommended IATA rates if they are clearly unreasonable.
Our acceptance of the IATA mechanism is predicated upon strict adherence by carriers to their IATA agreements. If the agreements are violated we
will have to reconsider our relationship to IATA and our authority over
violations.2

Thus, although this Statement itself contains a reaffirmation of our general opposition to restrictive institutions and arrangements in international
air transportation,' and in spite of the fact that concerted price-fixing by
t Ph.D., Radcliffe, 1948. Author: FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION
(1948) and Articles In Legal and Economic Periodicals. Associate Editor, Journal of Air Law &
Commerce.
IStatement on International Air Transport Policy (April, 1963). The Interagency Steering
Committee which submitted the Statement to the President was made up of the following members: N. E. Halaby, Federal Aviation Agency, Chairman; Kenneth R. Hansen, Bureau of the Budget,
Executive Secretary; Alan S. Boyd, Civil Aeronautics Board; Hollis B. Chenery, Agency for International Development; Griffith Johnson, Department of State; C. Daniel Martin, Department of
Commerce; and Frank K. Sloan, Department of Defense. 30 J. Air L. & Com. (1964).
1 Id.,p. 79.
aid., p. 76: "The size of the United States aviation market tends to give our aviation policies much weight in the world air transport system. This influence must be placed on the side of
expansion not restriction. Within the legal and regulatory framework in which the system operates,
it must be as free from restrictions as possible, whether these be imposed by government or through
intercarrier arrangements. Any policy of arbitrarily restricting capacity, dividing markets by carrier
agreements, encouraging high rates or curtailing service for which a demand exists, would be harmful to our national interests. Such a policy would not be in accord with our basic attitudes toward
private enterprise; it would stunt the growth of air commerce and thus our carriers; it would
be contrary to our obligation to the public, to the passenger and shipper. Entrepreneurs of daring
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airlines is not permitted in this country even under a regulatory authority
with full powers over rates,4 the United States is now definitely recommitted to the support of agreed pricing by international air carriers,- subject to "pressure," "influence," and "efforts" by government agencies to
see that the agreed prices are not unreasonable. The motive for this recommitment is not far to seek: as the Statement suggests, no superior alternative
seemed possible of achievement.
There can be no doubt of the wisdom and realism of this position from
a short run point of view. Given the attitudes of other governments whose
interests are involved, it is unquestionable that no immediate real improvement in the present arrangements governing rates--or in those governing
other important economic variables such as routes and capacity--can be
expected, at least without the exercise of high-level diplomatic pressures to
"persuade" other nations to go along, a strategy which is presumably unacceptable to our government and also probably not in the national interest
broadly conceived. As the following study will show, the objectionable
features of the past development of international air fares have resulted
not from the existence of machinery for concerted pricing by carrier representatives, but from the underlying attitudes and policies of the governments concerned. Therefore, the abandonment of this machinery without
change in governmental attitudes would result simply in procedural disruption rather than in substantive improvement.
On the other hand, the Statement suggests perhaps too optimistic a view
of the effectiveness of the methods immediately available to the United
States government in its "efforts to secure reasonable rates," and makes no
attempt to formulate long-run policy guides for the more successful pursuit
of this objective in future years. In fact, prospects for bringing about "more
effective governmental influence on rates" by broadening the legal rate
authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board do not appear promising, and it
seems unlikely that use of the other methods recommended in the Statement will go far toward bringing about "reasonable rates," though the
vigorous employment of any means of influence may be expected somewhat to strengthen this country's bargaining position. It is the bargaining
method of rate-making, based on and necessitated by the underlying support of nations for the positions of their flag carriers, which has been the
main obstacle to the satisfactory development of international rates in the
past, and any significant change for the better can therefore come about
only as a result of an evolution away from protectionism. Given such an
evolution, the way would become open for the establishment of a more
competitive regime in rate-making and in other aspects of international air
transportation.
The following study will first review briefly some salient features of the
development of international air fares since World War II, and of the role
of governments in connection with this development. Second, the potential
and vision launched our air transport industry. We believe that the system should continue to
benefit from that irreplaceable stimulus to growth brought by competitive enterprise."
'The Board has held to the position that discussions and agreements with respect to domestic
air rates should be authorized "only upon a convincing showing that there [is] an immediate need
for basic changes in fare or rate structures or levels and that such changes [can] be practically
accomplished only through such discussions." Cherington, Airline Price Policy 108-109 (1958).
' The origins and organization of the rate-making machinery are described in J. G. Gazdik,
Rate-Making and the IATA Traffic Conferences, 16 J. Air L. & Com. 298 (1949).

INTERNATIONAL AIR FARES

usefulness of the rate authority recommended for the CAB, and of the
other available methods of influencing rates, will be discussed. Finally, some
suggestions will be offered concerning long-range policy objectives.
IATA

II. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR FARES UNDER

It is in the great market for air travel between the United States and
Europe that the effect of governmental policies acting directly on prices

through the IATA machinery can best be observed. In the other two
major markets served by United States carriers-international air travel in
the Western Hemisphere and over the Pacific Ocean-the phenomenon of
blocked rate initiatives, although not absent, has been of relatively minor
importance. Because Western Hemisphere governments did not give the
strong support to the IATA machinery which would have been necessary
for successful price-fixing, rate agreements have been ineffective in this area
throughout most of the post-War period. One crucial element in this governmental non-cooperation has been failure to quash competition by non-

IATA carriers. Other governmental policies, such as discrimination against
foreign-flag carriers in currency exchange, have also tended to undermine
attempts to establish agreed rate structures.' Probably in part because

of the limited number of competitive carriers in transpacific service, fares
have remained high and steady in that area in spite of substantial periods
when agreements were technically not in force.
'As the Board noted in a recent CAB Order (No. E-19294), fare levels have been lower in
this area than elsewhere, and in spite of "passenger load factors which do not appear unreasonably
low for those operations," the Latin American Services of United States-flag carriers have been
earning little or actually losing money, as is shown in the following table (CAB Order No.
E-19294, p. 5):
Passenger Load

Return on Investment'
Pan
American

Panagra

Braniff

Pan
American

Factor

Panagra

6.0%
64.8%
1957
2.2%
7.9%
-2.3
63.5
-2.0
.3
1958
67.5
-2.7
4.6
- .1
1959
65.3
1.9
-1.8
1960
-2.3
2.6
-3.4
63.2
1961
1.6
63.8
.9
6.6
-6.4
1962'
'Net profit after taxes and special items but before interest
worth plus long term debt.
bTwelve months ended September 30, 1962.

Braniff

52.8%
57.6%
48.8
53.1
60.5
51.2
57.4
53.1
62.0
49.5
66.2
48.2
as percent of net

Earnings of United States-flag carriers in the transpacific market have been satisfactory, to
say the least. In CAB Order No. E-20533 (March 2, 1964), disapproving a proposed reduction
of the round-trip discount on South Pacific fares from 10 to 5 per cent, the Board included the
following summary of U.S. carriers' transpacific earnings (p. 2):

Calendar Year

Return on Investment'
Northwest

Pan American

13.10%
4.46
13.02
15.0
17.8
19 6 3b
Net profit after taxes and special items, but before interest
of net worth plus long term debt.
b Twelve months ended September 30, 1963.
1959
1960
1961
1962

5.77%
10.39
10.84
15.4
18.5
expense, as percent

In contrast, reported earnings for United States operations which include transatlantic service have
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In the transatlantic market, there have been four important occasions
on which the decisions of IATA Traffic Conferences have brought about
upward modification of proposed fare reductions: (1) the institution of
the first CAB-approved transatlantic fares after the United States carriers
were authorized to join IATA in 1946; (2) the institution of tourist service; (3) the institution of economy fares; and (4) the first post-jet fare
reduction, effective in 1964. There have been no other major fare reductions
in this market since the inauguration of normal service after World War II.
At 325 dollars, the first agreed, Board-approved New York-London
fare, while thirteen per cent lower than the previous level, was eighteen
per cent higher than the fare which had been proposed earlier in 1946 by
Pan American,8 and forty-four per cent higher than a proposal made by
this carrier three years later In these earlier days-and, indeed, up until
only a few years ago-almost all international operations required a substantial governmental subsidy; and it is still true that the United States-flag
carriers are eligible for cost-plus subsidy should they need it to make ends
meet. Therefore, it has been possible to question the bona fides of these
proposals for fare reductions on the ground that they were designed to
impress the traveling public and (possibly) expand the carrier's business on
a losing basis, but without risk to its own finances: first, because they were

not expected to be accepted by other nations, and, second, because the
United States government would have had to foot the bill in the unlikely
event that the proposals were accepted.
For several reasons, however, it seems highly improbable that Pan American has deliberately proposed unprofitable fare cuts. Before 1951, it had

offered to "absorb any losses" which might result from its fare reductions;"
in that year its proposals finally received the approval of the CAB, an
agency noted for caution in matters of fare policy and solicitude for the
financial welfare of its regulatees." A far more plausible explanation for
Pan Am's leadership in price reductions is to be found in its management's

belief in the long-run profitability of low fares and expanded markets, plus
the lower cost level which this management has apparently been able to
achieve as compared with the European carriers-something which may
be inferred from the United States carrier's ability to operate profitably at
been moderate. In CAB Order No. E-19385
following comparisons for recent periods:

(March 18, 1963),

p. 3, the Board included the

Return on Investment
Transpacific
Transatlantic
TWA
Pan American
Pan American
Northwest
13.97%
4.0%
1.16%
9/30/62
13.89%
12/31/62
15.0
15.4
$.7
12.7
Both tourist and economy service were introduced on the Pacific a full two years after they were
available in the transatlantic market.
s Resolutions of the North Atlantic Traffic Conference Relating to Rates and General Conditions
of Carriage, 6 CAB 845, 850 (1946).
'Aviation Week, Nov. 28, 1949, p. 50.
" In connection with a CAB announcement issued in the spring of 1951, which called for the
initiation of low-fare, scheduled services in the transatlantic market the following year, Aviation
Week, p. 44, April 2, 1951, p. 44, commented: "At last [the Board] admits that there is something
to the transatlantic air coach service urged by Pan American World Airways since 1948." "After
two years of opposition to Pan Am's transatlantic coach fare application," the magazine continued,
"CAB now wants the regular airlines to tap the United States mass market for tourist travel abroad
-not just keep the present high-priced market. But on the matter of subsidies (if needed) to
start the service, CAB says little. But Pan Am, in its campaign for CAB permission, has, in the
past, offered to absorb any losses."
" Aviation Week, May 21, 1951, p. 69.
Year Ended
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the same fare levels at which many European airlines have recently been
making large losses. Several factors may well have contributed to the
relative expansion-mindedness of the United States carrier, for example:
(1) its exposure to non-IATA competition in the Western Hemisphere
international market and to non-scheduled carrier competition on the
New York-San Juan route; (2) the more consumer-oriented attitude of
United States public and political opinion toward air transport, in sharp
contrast with that in European countries, where tight protectionist controls
had been the rule virtually since the beginning of civil air transportation;
and (3) the possible relative disadvantage of the United States carrier in
such competitive areas as exotic foods and service, to which European
carriers turned their attention, and which were certainly diluted in effect
by the higher seating densities which accompanied lower-fare service.
Though superiority in quantity and quality of equipment has often been
cited as a reason for Pan Am's ability to profit from reduced fares, it seems
evident that this superiority has itself been the result of an expansionist
policy, rather than the other way around.
Tourist service was initiated on the North Atlantic in May 1952,
almost three years after the original proposal of this service by Pan American. As compared with the plan which had been indorsed by the CAB in
May 1951, the agreed fare level was higher by twenty per cent, and the
minimum seating capacities were significantly lower."
Economy fares and service were first offered on the North Atlantic in the
spring of 1958, a year after the inauguration date originally suggested by
Pan American. The agreed fare level was thirteen per cent lower than the
tourist fare in effect at the time of the original proposal, whereas Pan
American's proposal had envisaged a reduction of twenty-five per cent."
Like the tourist fare plan, this proposal had the endorsement of the CAB.
The commercial realism of the plan is further attested to by the facts (1)
that the non-IATA Icelandic carrier had at this time been operating successfully for several years on the North Atlantic route at fares far below
the IATA figures;14 and (2) that United States non-scheduled airlines had
offered to provide transatlantic services without subsidy, at fares representing large reductions from IATA levels.'
The prolonged failure of the transatlantic fare structure to adjust to the
much lower operating costs made possible by utilization of jet aircraft"6
cannot be attributed solely to obstructionism in or out of the Traffic Conferences. As is well-known, the introduction of the jets was marked by
the development of a very large degree of excess capacity in the trans"Aviation Week, Dec. 17, 1951, p. 83. The Board later commented (CAB Order No. E-9969,
Feb. 2, 1956): "Although there has been a gradual raising in the amenities and resulting costs of
tourist service, the most important factor in forcing the existing high level of tourist costs is
the unrealistically low minimum seating density required in tourist planes. In most cases, these
densities are substantially lower than used on domestic coach services and in some cases are as
much as twenty-five per cent less than used by non-IATA operators in international service."
"Aviation Week, May 28, 1956, p. 38; CAB Order No. E-10350 (Aug. 10, 1956).
'" See, for example, ICAO, Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly for 1960 (Montreal,
1961), p. 8.
"Late in 1955, North American Airlines made a formal application to "operate an experimental coach service between New York and Shannon, London, Paris, Frankfurt and Rome at
fares from $125 to $175 one-way" at "a maximum of two flights a day between New York and
the European points for a three-year trial period." Aviation Week, Dec. 12, 1955, p. 133.
" Operating expenses per available ton-mile for the Atlantic Division of Pan American were
twenty-five per cent lower for the year ended Sept. 30, 1961, than in 1958 (the last largely
pre-jet year).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
atlantic market, by extremely low load-factors for the airlines serving this

market, and by general financial reverses among these carriers.' Under the
circumstances, it is not surprising that bold proposals for fare reductions

were not immediately forthcoming, and that rate initiatives instead took

the form of secret undercutting of the agreed fare levels"s and a special
promotional discount available under closely circumscribed conditions.19
Nevertheless, the fare reductions which have at long last been effected
this year on the North Atlantic may be contrasted with the "thrift fares"
publicly proposed by Pan American in the summer of 19632 which were,
like the earlier proposals discussed above, supported by the CAB."' Under
this proposal, year-round jet "thrift" service would have been provided at
a fare almost forty per cent less than the effective one-way jet economy
fare. The actual fare reductions which went into effect on April 1, 1964,
are in fact not nearly so large as the size of the accompanying advertisements might seem to indicate. The so-called "twenty per cent cut in basic
fares" could be more accurately described as an experiment in promotional
off-peak pricing; for the peak tourist traffic, the reduction in jet economy
fares is so small as to be negligible. Similarly, the large first-class fare cut
applies to a very small percentage of the transatlantic traffic. The accompanying table summarizes the proposed and current New York-London
fares.

1 On this point, see, for example, Aviation Week, March 12,

1962, p. 150.
" See, for example, IATA Bulletin (January 1962).
'OA special discount fare, applicable to certain groups of twenty-five traveling together, was
put into effect in the spring of 1962.
"°In June 1963 Pan American "announced plans to reduce transatlantic one-way fares to
$160 and California-to-Hawaii fares to $100, subject to approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
"The new fares, an extension of the airline's present thrift class service between New York
and Puerto Rico, would cut $103 from the basic economy fare across the Atlantic to London and
$33 from the California-Hawaii fare level. Thrift class would be provided on a year-around,
daily flight schedule, occupying the entire capacity of turbojet aircraft now being used for
combination first class and economy service. Meals and other fringe benefits would be eliminated.
"If approved by CAB, the new service will be offered to Hawaii on November 1, while the
transatlantic service would not be started until April 1964. Purpose of the delay on the European
route is because it involves an international route, requiring the concurrence of the airlines and
their governments on the fare structure." Aviation Week, July 1, 1963, p. 37.
asAviation Week, Sept. 2, 1963, p. 31.
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COMPARISON OF NEW YORK-LONDON
1964
22
AND PRIOR FARES
Proposed fare
(effective 4/1/64)
Type of fare

Oneway

Roundtrip

Present fare
Oneway

Roundtrip

Amount of reduction
(* means "increase")
Oneway

Roundtrip

First-class -----------------------$375 $712.50
$475 $902.50 $100 $190
Economy-class:
Year-round
xx
xx
263 499.70
Low-level ------------ 210 399"5
xx xx
53 100.70
Peak-period ----------------255 484.50'
pxx xx
8
15.20
Group (25 or more) ------xx 3253
xx 310
15
14-21-day excursion -------xx 3004
xx 350
50
U.S. military personnel ---- xx 300
xx 349.80
49.80

Percent
reduction

21.1%

20.2
3.0
4.8*
14.3
14.3

NOTES: xx means "not available."
* means "increase."
1 Low-level economy fares Commencing travel in Western Hemisphere: August 4 through
May 21. Commencing travel in Europe: September 29 through July 16.
2 Peak economy fares Commencing travel in Western Hemisphere: May 22 through August 3.
Commencing travel in Europe: July 17 through September 28.
aNorth Atlantic group fares Eastbound, exclusive of weekends in June and July: June 1
through June 25; July 13 through September 15. Westbound, exclusive of weekends in August and
September: June 1 through August 20; September 7 through September 15. (All travel to be
completed by September 30, 1964.)
4 14-21-day excursion fares Outbound travel originating in North America, exclusive of weekends: **February 15 through June 11; July 13 through August 6; August 31 through November
5. Outbound travel originating in Europe, exclusive of weekends: **February 1s through June 4;
June 29 through August 20; September 14 through November 5.
'Dependent upon periods of commencement of travel, one-half of peak round-trip fares may
be combined with one-half of low economy-class round-trip fares.
** Effective April 1, 1964.

III. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN RATE-MAKING
The failure of Pan Am's rate initiatives to win acceptance in the Traffic
Conference has been due to opposition by representatives of European airlines. With respect to three of the instances described above, there is conclusive evidence that the positions of the European carriers were solidly
backed up by their respective governments, just as the governmental or
quasi-governmental status of these carriers would lead one to expect. In the
remaining case, there is no reason to believe that any substantial difference
of opinion existed between leading European carriers and governments.
Thus it is not realistic to regard these rate decisions as the work of an

ordinary business price ring, or to criticize the CAB for the ineffectiveness
of its attempts to "regulate" the decisions of the Traffic Conferences. Moreover, one may infer that these rate decisions differed very little, if at all,
from the decisions which would have been arrived at through direct negotiation among the governments concerned, if the Traffic Conference machinery
had not existed.
As to the earliest fare agreements, it is well-known that the fare reductions previously proposed by Pan American met with determined opposition by European governments,aa and that the relatively high level of the
" CAB Press Release (March 11, 1964).
" Pan American's proposed fare of $275, New York-London, was withdrawn and the previous
fare of $375 reinstated, upon the insistence of the British Government, which threatened forcibly
to curtail service to its airports by Pan Am unless the change were made. Ryan, Recent Developments in U. S. International Air Transport Policy, Air Affairs, September 1946, pp. 54-55.
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agreed fares was a necessary condition for their approval by these governments.
While it is certainly true that the Civil Aeronautics Board opposed the
introduction of tourist service on the North Atlantic prior to 1 9 5 2 ,2 and
this not entirely because of "the strenuous opposition of foreign carriers,"2
there is no doubt that the higher level of fares (and lower density of seating) provided for in the finally adopted agreement were brought about
by the need to accommodate the views of European carriers. Moreover,
while the evidence does seem to indicate that a "compromise" agreement
may have been directly arrived at by representatives of the CAB and the
British Government,"7 this "compromise" fare level, if it was such, was
far closer to the original BOAC position than it was to the Pan Am
proposal originally endorsed by the Board. Thus there appears to be
nothing in the record to support the intimations of Pan Am representatives that BOAC and Air France spokesmen were in serious disagreement
with their governments on the issue of fare reductions."
Both the institution of economy fares and the recent jet fare episode
were marked by direct action of European (non-airline) government
officials in support of their carriers' positions, and by very largely unsuccessful attempts on the part of the Civil Aeronautics Board to modify fare
decisions contrary to its own recommendations and to the proposals of
the United States-flag carriers.
Just before the announcement of Pan Am's plans for economy service,
the Board had tried and failed to bring about lower fares and higher
density seating for the transatlantic tourist market, its failure being a
direct result of opposition by European governments. In February 1956,
at a time when the attention of the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House
Committee on the Judiciary (the Celler Committee) was directed toward
IATA and its relations with the Board,2 and when the CAB furthermore
still had before it the proposals of a non-scheduled carrier to operate
internationally at very low fares,a° the Board formally announced its intention to disapprove an IATA agreement providing for a ten per cent
increase in first-class fares on the North Atlantic, on the ground that the
'See, for example, Aviation Week, April 2, 1951, p. 44, where what were described as "CAB
sources" were said to hold the opinion that "the strenuous opposition of foreign carriers has
been the main reason for past CAB opposition to air coach."
22 Even in the spring of 1951, the same "CAB sources" whosse opinion was cited supra, note 24,
were still doubtful about the year-round profitability to tourist fares on the Atlantic. The negative
attitude of the Board toward air coach in domestic markets in the earlier years is, moreover,
well-known.
" See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1951, p. 5, col. 3.
27 As late as September 1951, BOAC representatives had (at least publicly) insisted on a minimum
New York-London fare of $275, Ibid. In November of that year, after the British general election,
BOAC announced that it favored a $266 one-way fare. Shortly after this, TWA, which had
opposed a deep general fare cut, publicly asserted that the CAB had instructed the U.S. carriers
to settle for a $477 round-trip fare. (With the 10% discount, the BOAC fare came to $479
round-trip.) Though Pan American then declared that $477 had been set by the Board as a
bargaining ceiling, the Board's formal letter of instruction to the carriers specifically endorsed
$477 as a "sound" on-season fare. Aviation Week, Oct. 1, 1951, p. 45, and Nov. 19, 1951, p. 17.
Pan Am had proposed a fare of $225 one-way, $405 round-trip, Aviation Week, May 1, 1951.
The fare finally instituted, at $270 one-way, $486 round-trip ($417 off-season), was even closer
to the original British position.
28 Aviation Week, Oct. 1, 1951, p. 45.
29A record of the Committee's thorough and enlightening proceedings can be found in Hearings
before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Monopoly Problems
in Regulated Industries, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1957).
3°Aviation Week, Dec. 12, 1955, p. 133.
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agreement should have also provided for a reduction in tourist fares and
a higher seating density for this type of service. In its Order containing
this announcement, the Board stated its belief that "tourist fares generally
[were] higher than can be justified on the basis of a standard of service . . .designed to meet the needs of a mass transportation medium";
pointed out that the minimum seating density required in tourist planes
was in general "substantially lower than used on domestic coach services
and in some cases [was] as much as twenty-five per cent less than used
by non-IATA operators in international service"; and put the carriers
on notice that "the Board [considered] it urgent that at the next conference meeting, action be taken to modify the seating densities and other
standards of tourist-class service so as to reduce substantially its costs and
make available the lower fares required by the public interest."'"
As a result of protests by foreign governments and IATA representatives, the Board very shortly afterwards reversed its previous stand and
approved the IATA fare resolutions for the 1956 season."a Later that
spring, Pan American announced its plan for institution of a new lowfare service along the general lines favored by the Board. 3 This proposal
received the "emphatic support" of that agency, which in a formal statement called for "an inauguration date [for the new service] not later than
April 1, 1957.""4 (The Pan Am proposal apparently did not itself result
from the Board's declarations; however, it may well be that the timing
of the announcement was affected by the activities and attitudes of the
CAB and the Celler Committee.)
This new Board statement was again met by firm opposition on the
part of foreign governments, this time in a declaration arrived at at a
meeting of the chief officials dealing with civil aviation from all fourteen
of the European governments whose flag airlines were in transatlantic
service." As has been noted, the economy fares were not actually instituted
until April 1, 1958, and then at a level significantly higher than had been
proposed. The agreements establishing these fares were accepted by the
Board with severe criticism. Later that year, Board representatives journeyed to Europe for consultations with foreign government officials, for
the announced purpose of bringing about "reconsideration of the North
Atlantic fare structure prior to the 1957 on-season period."3 In spite of
these efforts, the agreements were not modified.
A strikingly similar course of events took place in 1963-64. After some
four years of advocating a downward fare revision to reflect the lower
jet aircraft operating costs,"' and in the knowledge that a high-level In31CAB Order No. E-9969 (Feb. 2, 1956).
32
CAB Order No. E-10017 (Feb. 20, 1956).
a3Aviation Week, May 28, 1956, p. 38.
'4Statement
of Board Position with Respect to the Major Issues to be Considered at the IATA
Traffic Conference Meetings, Cannes, May 29, 1956.
aAccording to the N.Y. Times, May 30, 1956, p. 1, col. 1, the French chief of civil aviation
"warned that the European governments would not permit a rate war. If the airlines failed to
reach the required unanimous agreement, he said, the governments would take action under
terms of the bilateral treaties governing airline operations between various countries."
wCAB Order No. E-10350 (Aug. 10, 1956).
37For example, in approving the IATA fares resolutions in the spring of 1959, the Board
said: ". . . the future development of international air transportation will depend, in the last
analysis, upon adequate availability of service priced at the lowest level economically feasible.
This is particularly true with respect to the North Atlantic with its large tourist travel potential.
To the extent that jet services prove themselves to be more efficient than operations with piston
aircraft, as they show every likelihood of doing, we shall expect that the cost advantage accruing
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teragency Committee"B was casting an inquiring eye on current fare levels,
the Board, in February 1963, announced its intention of disapproving
IATA resolutions (adopted at Chandler, Arizona, in the fall of 1962)
calling for (among other things) a reduction in the round-trip discount on
the transatlantic jet economy fares from ten to five per cent. 9 In spite of
the apparently sound economic reasoning underlying the Board's stand,
and in spite of the fact that its action was intended to be in the carriers'
own financial interest rather than with a view to reducing profits," representatives not only of IATA and of European airlines but also of European
governments promptly appealed to the Board to reverse its decision, at
first to no avail, since this decision was made "final" in mid-March. 1 The
sequel has been described by the Board as follows:
Many European governments . . . strongly supported the increase and
European carriers filed the higher tariffs. The controversy remained unresolved
and certain governments took steps to require United States carriers to charge
the higher fares as a condition of entry into their countries. Additionally,
strong representations were made to our Department of State. Under the
circumstances, and in the absence of direct legislative authority, it was the
Department's recommendation that the Board's outstanding instructions to
the United States carriers to maintain pre-Chandler fares should be modified
to the extent necessary not to subject the carriers to penalties for violations
of the regulations and laws of the countries which they served. The Board
so modified its instructions and the carriers filed tariffs reflecting the increases
to a number of European countries prior to May 24, 1963.42
On May 29, therefore, the Board approved the previously rejected

fare plan as modified (in a minor degree) by a "compromise" reached
to the carriers will be passed along to the passenger through reductions in fares, to the ultimate
and mutual benefit of both the traveling public and the carriers." CAB Order No. E-13631
(March 19, 1959).
" The members of this Committee are listed in footnote one, above.
39CAB Order No. E-19294 (Feb. 12, 1963).
401d., pp. 4-5: "Admittedly, earnings of the United States flag carriers operating on the
North Atlantic are at present substandard. These substandard earnings, however, appear to stem
basically from low load factors reflecting the precipitous increase in capacity resulting from conversion to virtually all jet service in a very short span of time. . . . The following table shows
the growth in capacity and traffic and decline in load factor in the past four years in the North
Atlantic market . . .
All TATA Carriers
Passenger
Seats
Revenue
Load
Year
Operated
Change
Passengers
Change
Factor
1959
1,822,621
1,204,377
66.1
1960
2,413,921
32.4
1,534,346
27.4
63.6
1961
3,286,294
36.1
1,654,306
7.8
50.3
1962
3,891,398
18.4
1,981,415
19.8
50.9
In such a situation, inadequate earnings are not the result of unreasonable fares but rather of the
low load factor resulting from the inbalance between traffic growth and capacity. . . . Any
increase in fares in a tourist market such as this which, by its nature, is highly sensitive to price
serves only to postpone the time when traffic and capacity may come into a profitable relationship."
4CAB Order No. E-19385 (March 18, 1963), which reads in part as follows (pp. 1-2):
"A statement urging the Board to approve the agreements in toto without conditions has been
submitted by the Secretary of Traffic Conference I of IATA acting on behalf of 28 of the
interested IATA carriers. An individual statement was received from British Overseas Airways
Corporation (BOAC). Messages concurring in the IATA Statement on behalf of the carriers
were received from Compagnie de Transports Aeriens Intercontinentaux (TAI) and Sudan Airways.
In addition, representations in support of the agreement have been received from certain
European countries."
2
4 CAB Order No. E-19625 (May 29, 1963), pp. 1-2.
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through inter-carrier negotiation at Montreal five days before."3 In the
same Order, the agency re-stated its views (1) "that the pre-Chandler
level of fares [was] more than adequate to produce reasonable earnings"
and (2) "that, under efficient operation, the economics of jet operations

should provide the potential for a significant reduction in jet economy
fares." "In this connection," the Board continued, "we are convinced
that, all else equal, the carriers should be in a position to offer significantly

lower fares for the period beyond April 1, 1964." There followed a series
of conferences which resulted in the January 1964 fare plan which has
been described above.
IV.

THE POTENTIAL USEFULNESS OF
TO

FIx

CAB

POWER

INTERNATIONAL RATES

With respect to rates in international air transportation, the legal authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board at present extends mainly to the
removal of discrimination." The most important considerations which
prompted first the Congress and then the Board itself to reject extension
of regulation in this field appear to have been two: first, the analogy of
ocean shipping, where full rate regulation had been regarded as unworkable and undesirable; and second, the position of the United States carriers,
notably Pan American, who argued that flexibility in rate-making was
essential to enable them to meet foreign competition and avoid retaliatory
measures by foreign governments." For many years now, however, the
Board has regularly petitioned the Congress for international rate powers
equivalent to those exercised by it in the domestic field. Under the air
transport agreement arrived at with representatives of the United Kingdom
at Bermuda in 1946, the United States government undertook to use its
best efforts to obtain such powers. More recently, as has been noted above,
the President has endorsed a statement declaring that this authority should
be granted to the CAB in order to "provide for more effective govern' In its approving Order, the Board described the agreement as follows (p. 2): "The fare
agreement here before the Board readopts the Chandler-agreed North and Mid-Atlantic fares,
with the total increases to be effective thereafter for an interim period through July 15, 1963,
and proposes a compromise agreement to be effective thereafter for a period limited in duration
to March 31, 1964. The compromise provides a reduction from the Chandler-agreed economyclass fares for application on the North Atlantic of $7.00 one-way and $13.30 round-trip. In
relation to the fare structure which prevailed prior to April 1, 1963, the Montreal agreement
reflects a minor reduction of the one-way economy fares coupled with an increase in round-trip
fares. It is estimated that the net effect on the general level of transatlantic economy fares would
be an increase of from 1.5 to 2.0 percent."
"The
provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act with respect to international rates and fares
have been summarized as follows: "Both domestic and foreign companies engaged in foreign air
transportation must file with the Board tariffs containing all their rates, and they may not change
these rates without giving lawful notice. They are also governed by the same provisions concerning
rebates, free or reduced rate transportation, filing of divisions, and unjust discrimination or undue
prejudice that are applicable to interstate carriers. But they are not subject to the duties of
providing adequate service, establishing through service and rates, establishing fair and reasonable
rates, or agreeing upon equitable divisions with other carriers. Neither may the Board require
them to establish fair and reasonable rates, nor may it set rates which are to be charged for
passengers and express, suspend rates which appear to be unreasonable, require the establishment
of through service, or control rates established by them with other types of common carriers."
Puffer, Air Transportation 389 (1941).
' The Act directed the Board to report to the Congress on the advisability of extending full
rate control over international operations. The duly submitted report relied mainly on the arguments cited here in the text in advising against the extension; the report also asserted that the
Board's powers over discrimination, unfair methods of competition, certification, mail rates, etc.
gave the agency a considerable degree of control over international rates.H.R. Doc. No. 478,
76th Cong., 2d Sess., 1939.
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mental influence on rates," and the apparent impotence of the United
States government in the face of European refusal to accept lower fares
on the North Atlantic routes in 1963 has added some urgency to this demand.
It seems obvious that an agency of the United States government, or
of any single government, cannot be expected unilaterally to control
international air fares as it can the prices charged for transportation
within national boundaries. International rates directly involve the interests
of more than one nation because carriers of more than one flag are generally competing on any important route and because passengers and
shippers are similarly of more than one nationality. Such rates are subject
to influence by more than one nation because international carriage cannot exist physically without the assent of at least two nations.
If, then, the rate authority of the CAB is ever to be used as a regulatory
instrument, as distinguished from a bargaining weapon, this use will have
to be made in the context of decisions and policies arrived at multilaterally,
in cooperation with other concerned governments. Though it has been
argued in the past that such cooperative supervision was then possible,
and would become effective if only the Board were given full legislative
authority over rates," it seems quite clear, in the light of the facts brought
out in the preceding section of this study, that the necessary intergovernmental agreement on principles has not existed. The possibility of international cooperation in this field therefore belongs in the category of longrange prospects, and will be considered in the concluding section.
Putting aside for the moment the question of effective regulation, and
accepting the facts of international life as they are, we turn to consider
the potential usefulness of the rate power as an addition to the arsenal of
the United States in the bargaining process which now determines international rates. On its face, it might seem that any additional governmental power should have at least some potential nuisance value, in
some conceivable bargaining context, and that nothing would be lost
even if the power were never used. As will be seen, however, things are
not so simple.
Extension of the authority of the Board over international rates has
been most recently and most conspicuously advocated by United States
government representatives in connection with the 1963 conflict over jet
fares." In his letter to the Board "suggesting" withdrawal from its
"The outstanding example of this type of argument was offered by the Board to the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee early in 1956. Here Board representatives
asserted that "Without effective rate power in the Board there is no effective control over TATA
and it assumes the status of a monopolistic price-fixing cartel," and also that "The real conflict
often arises not between various governments supporting their respective carriers but between
the carriers as a group offering policies which their governments as a group have agreed to be
undesirable." Thus the Board felt able to assure the legislators that its "exercise of the rate power
. . . under the proposed legislation [would] provide effective governmental control over the
international rate structure to and from the United States vitally needed to protect the interests
of passengers and shippers." Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee
on the Judiciary on Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries 2561-2565, supra note 29.
"' In its Report on a bill signed to extend full regulation to international rates, the Senate
Commerce Committee asserted that the proposed legislation "would maintain the present mechanism
for establishing international air transport rates through the International Air Transport Association, but would give the Board the statutory tools needed to perform its responsibility to protect
the traveler and the shipper by obtaining rates which are just and reasonable." S. Rep. No. 473,
Part 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). However, testimony before the Committee by Government
representatives emphasized the tactical value of the rate power rather than its use in the direct
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original position, the Secretary of State strongly implied that the absence
of this authority necessitated this country's retreat. s However, the facts
do not appear to support this implication. Under the Bermuda-type
bilateral agreements which govern international air operations between
this country and major European nations, including the United Kingdom,
it is true that the right of the European government to suspend United
States-flag services (pending arbitration) terminates if and when full
rate authority is granted by law to the Civil Aeronautics Board." Hence,
if the Board had possessed the rate power last spring, the Europeans would
not have been able to threaten to suspend the services of United States
airlines. On the other hand, by the same provision, the United States also
possesses the right to suspend the services of other nations until the Board
receives the rate power. The available alternative to retreat was, then, the
use (or threatened use) of our suspension power to halt British and other
services conducted at rates which were in our opinion too high.
Why was this course not adopted? Briefly, because neither the State
Department nor the Board had, or at any rate would admit to having,
regulation of rates. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce on International Air
Transportation Rates, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
" This letter reads in relevant parts as follows: "In view of the absence of legislative authority
in the United States Government and the Civil Aeronautics Board to regulate rates in international
air transportation, and in order to protect the competitive position of the United States carriers,
we would suggest that the advice of the Civil Aeronautics Board contained in the May 1 letters
to the United States-flag carriers should be modified insofar as is necessary not to subject the carriers
to penalties for violation of laws and regulations of foreign countries.
"We believe this situation emphasizes the need, recognized in the President's statement on air
policy, for prompt passage of legislation giving the Civil Aeronautics Board authority over fares
in international air transportation." Ibid., p. 5.
4 Agreement with the United Kingdom Relating to Air Services, Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat.
1499, T.I.A.S. No. 1507, Annex II at 1505-06. The pertinent provisions read:
"(e) In the event that power is conferred by law upon the aeronautical authorities of the
United States to fix fair and economic rates for the transport of persons and property by air on
international services and to suspend proposed rates in a manner comparable to that in which
the Civil Aeronautics Board at present is empowered to act with respect to such rates for the
transport of persons and property by air within the United States, each of the Contracting Parties
shall thereafter exercise its authority in such manner as to prevent any rate or rates proposed by
one of its carriers for services from the territory of one Contracting Party to a point or points
in the territory of the other Contracting Party from becoming effective, if, in the judgment
of the aeronautical authorities of the Contracting Party whose air carrier or carriers is or are
proposing such rate, that rate is unfair or uneconomic. If one of the Contracting Parties on
receipt of the notification referred to in paragraph (c) above is dissatisfied with the new rate
proposed by the air carrier or carriers of the other Contracting Party, it shall so notify the other
Contracting Party prior to the expiry of the first fifteen of the thirty days referred to, and the
Contracting Parties shall endeavour to reach agreement on the appropriate rate. In the event that
such agreement is reached each Contracting Party will exercise its statutory powers to give effect
to such agreement. If agreement has not been reached at the end of the thirty day period referred
to in paragraph (c) above, the proposed rate may, unless the aeronautical authorities of the
country of the air carrier concerned see fit to suspend its operation, go into effect provisionally
pending the settlement of any dispute in accordance with the procedure outlined in paragraph
(g) below.
"(f) Prior to the time when such power may be conferred by law upon the aeronautical
authorities of the United States, if one of the Contracting Parties is dissatisfied with any new rate
proposed by the air carrier or carriers of either Contracting Party for services from the territory
of one Contracting Party to a point or points in the territory of the other Contracting Party,
it shall so notify the other prior to the expiry of the first fifteen of the thirty day period referred
to in paragraph (c) above, and the Contracting Parties shall endeavour to reach agreement on
the appropriate rate. In the event that such agreement is reached each Contracting Party will
use its best efforts to cause such agreed rate to be put into effect by its air carrier or carriers.
It is recognized that if no such agreement can be reached prior to the expiry of such thirty days,
the Contracting Party raising the objection to the rate may take such steps as it may consider
necessary to prevent the inauguration or continuation of the service in question at the rate
complained of." (Paragraph (c) provides for 30 days' notice of any proposed rate change. Paragraph (g) provides for arbitration.)
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authority to take this action, which was clearly within the prerogative of
the United States government." Thus, either the necessary authority was
possessed by one or both of these agencies but was not used, or the agency
responsible for effective implementation of the rights of the United States
under international agreements had been asleep at the switch for seventeen years. In either case, it would seem to be a relatively simple matter
to clarify the location of authority and to remedy whatever procedural
deficiencies may exist, so that the suspension power will be available for
future use.
As matters stood last spring, the United States suspension power could
have been a powerful weapon in the immediate bargaining situation. What
would have happened if an exchange of suspension threats had reached
the stage of action might have depended to some extent on the relative
advantageousness of the alternative landing arrangements which could
have been made by the carriers-e.g., the disadvantage (to a United
States-flag carrier) of landing in, say, Ireland instead of England, as compared with the disadvantage (to a European carrier) of landing in a
neighboring country instead of the United States. Even if this impasse
had never materialized, these considerations of alternative arrangements
would obviously have affected the relative value of the suspension power
as a bargaining weapon to the various nations concerned. It is significant,
however, that major European nations have more to lose, in a balance of
payments sense, than the United States does from any diminution of
transatlantic tourist traffic.
On the other hand, if the CAB had possessed full rate powers in the
spring of 1963, our carriers' services could not have been suspended and
would thus have been free, pending the outcome of arbitration, to continue at the lower rates favored by the Board. Because of the large amount
of excess capacity available at that time, the resulting competitive pressure would very likely have forced foreign airlines to lower their own
rates to conform to those of the United States airlines. Thus the rate
power would also have been an effective weapon. In the absence of excess
capacity, the extent of any shift of traffic to the lower-rate carriers would
have been minor, and the opportunity for indirectly forcing foreign
carriers to conform to lower rates would have been small or non-existent.
(A sizeable increase in capacity by United States carriers to take care of
traffic shift need not be considered as a relevant possibility here, first,
because such an increase would almost certainly fall afoul of the provisions of the Bermuda Agreement,"5 and, second, because the time re"0During the Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce on International Air Transportation Rates supra note 47, Chairman Magnuson asked a State Department Legal Adviser,
Abram Chayes, to explain why the United States had not exercised the right to suspend service
which is clearly provided in the last sentence of paragraph (f) of the Bermuda Agreement. The
Chairman read this sentence aloud, and the following colloquy ensued (p. 37):
"The Chairman: We couldn't take any such steps?
"Mr. Chayes: No; it is our position we have the international right to take such steps.
"The Chairman: Why didn't we take them?
"Mr. Chayes: Because we don't have any domestic authority to do so. The Board says it
doesn't have the power.
"The Chairman: I am not talking about the Board. It is in the executive department.
"Mr. Chayes: Well, the State Department can't call Idlewild and tell them not to let British
carriers land."
" In particular, the following often-overlooked commitment contained in the Final Act of
the Bermuda Conference: "That, in the operation by the air carriers of either Government of
the trunk services described in the Annex to the Agreement, the interest of the air carriers of
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quired for such an increase would probably rule it out during the time
period relevant here-i.e., the period before the conclusion of arbitration.)
Generally speaking, the relative effectiveness of the rate power versus
the suspension power, as instruments of temporary control (pending
arbitration) under the Bermuda-type bilaterals, varies according to the
particular circumstances at hand. As to cases in which the Board might
wish to enforce a ceiling, we may distinguish (1) those in which the
Board is opposed by foreign but not by United States-flag airlines; (2) those
in which the Board is opposed by United States-flag but not by foreign
airlines; and (3) those in which the Board is opposed by both United
States-flag and foreign airlines. Where there is a large amount of excess
capacity, cases (1) and (3) are effectively dealt with by the use of the
United States rate power (with the implied absence of the European suspension power) but can also be dealt with by the United States suspension power, which would probably bring about temporary compliance on
the part of the European carriers. As to case (2), a large amount of excess
capacity here would enable the Board to effectuate a ceiling against United
States carriers merely by raising no objection to lower rates proposed by
foreigners. Without a large amount of excess capacity, case (1) could be
better dealt with by the suspension power, since the CAB cannot in any
case, under the Bermuda-type bilateral, directly set the rates charged by
foreign carriers; case (2) by the rate power; and case (3) could not be
effectively dealt with by either power alone.
As to cases in which the Board might wish to enforce a floor, we may
again distinguish the three types of carrier opposition enumerated above.
(It is not necessary here to treat separately situations which are characterized by substantial overcapacity, since the indirect enforcement of a
floor through competitive pressure is obviously out of the question.) The
general conclusion here is the same as that reached with respect to the
enforcement of a ceiling: case (1) would seem to call for the use of the
suspension power; case (2) for the rate power; and case (3) defies treatment within the Bermuda-type bilateral. In spite of past history, it would
be unrealistic to suppose that case (1) will never arise in practice; for
example, it is certainly not beyond the bounds of possibility that subsidized competition by the carriers of nations to which we are linked by
Bermuda-type bilaterals will at some point be best discouraged by the
use, or the prospect of the use, of the suspension power to enforce a rate
floor.

In general, then, legislation extending the Board's authority over international rates would increase its power to impose its will on United Statesflag carriers at the cost of abandoning a relatively effective weapon of
control over foreign-flag carriers. This conclusion applies, of course, only
to situations governed by Bermuda-type bilaterals, and even here only
in the "short short run." If these agreements could be renegotiated so that
both rate and suspension powers could be simultaneously available, the
United States government would possess a larger arsenal of weapons, but
the same would be true of the other party to the agreement; the net effect
of the change is thus difficult to predict. But whether the suspension power
is brought to life, or the rate power substituted for it, or both powers made
the other Government shall be taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly the services
which the latter provides on all or part of the same routes."
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simultaneously available through renegotiation and legislation, under the
Bermuda-type bilaterals the final appeal is to arbitration. It seems highly
improbable that the outcome of arbitration would tend to conform to
accepted economic pricing principles. A "compromise" solution, avoiding
"hardship" to any affected party, is much more likely.
Thus, in the end, it appears that no mere bargaining weapon can be
expected in itself to bring about a radical shift from the type of compromise rate-making which exists at the present time. However, it must also
be said that a real readiness on the part of the United States to use whatever
bargaining weapons are available can almost surely be counted on to bring
about ultimate rate decisions more satisfactory to this government than
will come about through simple surrender, if only through impressing the
arbitrators with the sincerity and weight of this country's position. For
this reason, and in view of the high probability that the position of the
United States government will tend more nearly to coincide, in the near
future, with that of the United States-flag carriers rather than with that
of foreign airlines, it may be very desirable to lose no time in activating
the suspension power.
A similar general conclusion holds with respect to situations where a
Bermuda-type bilateral is not in force. Here the rate and suspension powers
could readily be made simultaneously available, and some strengthening
of the United States position would undoubtedly result if they were provided. (As the law now stands, it seems unlikely that the Board can legally
use its authority to suspend Foreign Air Carrier Permits for purposes of
rate control.") Again, relative bargaining positions depend in part on
the severity and cost of the sanctions that can be employed by the parties,
and the evaluation of these sanctions involves many complex questions
(for example: when is it advisable for the United States to exclude a
South American subsidized airline from its airports at the cost of having
United States-flag carriers cut off from a large-scale traffic to and from,
or by way of, the South American country concerned?). But these considerations are not the only ones which will affect the outcome of such a
dispute. As long as the nations continue to identify the policies and interests of their flag carriers with their own national interest, an "equitable"
compromise which entails no drastic consequences for either party will
have to be sought; and the ultimate result will probably not differ greatly
from that to be expected from arbitration. Here again, however, it must
also be concluded that United States readiness to act is likely to bring
about somewhat more desirable results than complete passivity.
To sum up: Given the persistence of the typical attitudes of national
governments toward their flag carriers, the effect of widening the rate
authority of the CAB will be a gain in bargaining power where Bermudatype bilaterals do not apply. Where they do apply, to give the Board full
rate powers would mean abandoning the suspension weapon, which can
readily be made available and which would in all probability be more
useful in strengthening the United States position in the near future.
However, it may be doubted that the existence or even the exercise of
either power would ultimately bring about international rates greatly
different from what they would be without it.
The above conclusion as to the tactical superiority of the suspension
" On this point, see "CAB
584-585 (1962).

Regulation of International Aviation," 75 Harv. L. Rev.

575,
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power under the Bermuda-type bilaterals rests on the assumption that the
United States government will, in the near future, be more nearly in
agreement with the United States-flag than with foreign-flag carriers in
matters of rates. If the reverse were true, the rate power would be the
preferable weapon, since it would enable the CAB directly to impose its
will on the United States-flag carriers. There is no doubt that it was just
this sort of use for the rate power which was envisaged when United States
representatives at Bermuda committed their government to try to obtain
extended powers for the Board.
In short, these powers were intended to be used to curb the ratecutting propensities of the United States-flag carrier and thus to aid in
the maintenance of the rate structure agreed in the IATA Traffic Conferences. As has been noted above, shortly before the Bermuda meeting
the British government had felt it necessary to threaten curtailment of
Pan American's services to prevent that airline from operating into the
United Kingdom at sharply reduced fares. It was with this episode in view
that the Agreement was drawn to provide that unilateral suspension, as
an ultimate protective weapon, would be renounced only after the Board
had received authority to control that carrier's rates. This authority was
thus clearly regarded as a substitute for protective suspension and a means
of making effective the United States government's undertaking to support concerted rate-making, an undertaking which was an integral part
of the "bargain" made at Bermuda. 3 As compared with suspension of
United States services by a foreign government, rate control by the CAB
has the not inconsiderable advantage, from the point of view of the
supporters of IATA, of minimizing unfavorable reaction among the

United States press and public.
V. OTHER MEANS OF SECURING REASONABLE RATES

Of the other means of securing reasonable rates suggested in the Statement of Policy, special consideration need be given only to the support

of charter services. The two remaining devices-disapproval of IATA
recommendations and inter-governmental discussions-have been dealt
with in the preceding section; their effectiveness has been negligible and
will doubtless continue to be small without a marked change in the attitudes of other governments.
In a recent order54 certificating domestic and foreign charter service by
two supplemental carriers, and loosening to some extent the tight restrictions with which it has circumscribed the provision of such services in the

past, the CAB stated its belief "that the conduct of charter services by
a group of certificated specialists should be of substantial benefit in maintaining and/or increasing low cost services in the transatlantic market,"
and continued:
The adoption of the IATA group fares was, in some measure at least, instigated by the availability of the transatlantic charters by Part 295 carriers
[i.e. carriers not certificated to carry passengers in scheduled service], and
their continuation is dependent upon the concerted action of the IATA carriers. The certification of transatlantic charter specialists should not only
53 The Civil Aeronautics Board has emphasized the usefulness of the rate power as a means
of enforcing compliance with IATA rate agreements. See, e.g., Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee on the Judiciary on Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries supra note 29 at 2565.
"4 TransatlanticCharter Investigation, CAB Orders No. E-20530 and E-20531 (Feb. 24, 1964).
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provide a stimulus to the IATA carriers to develop a fare structure directed
at developing a mass market; such certification will help to assure the continued provision of low cost air transportation in the seasonal transatlantic
market, whatever course scheduled individually ticketed fares should take.5"
There can be no doubt that the charter services have been an important
source of low-cost transportation in the transatlantic market in recent
years. In 1962, according to the CAB, these services accounted for 11.4
per cent of transatlantic passengers,"6 at reported fare levels approximately
fifty-five dollars lower than IATA group fares. 7 Moreover, the development of these services will be facilitated by the recent revision of Part 295
to permit split charters (i.e., the chartering of one-half of the capacity of
a plane on a time, mileage or trip basis), to eliminate the 20,000 membership limit on organizations eligible to charter, and "to remove existing
restrictions on travel agents assisting in the formation of charter groups,
handling the sale of air transportation to members of the group, engaging
in the administration of a charter flight, soliciting individuals for land
tours and receiving a commission for a charter flight or land tour if the
agent is a member of the chartering organization.""5
For several reasons, however, the impact of this action on regular rates
and services can be expected to be small. In the first place, the supplemental carriers apparently have been and presumably still will be at
a competitive disadvantage compared with the better-known, largely
European scheduled airlines which have also been engaged in transatlantic
charter service for several years. In 1962, Part 295 carriers (including
cargo carriers) accounted for only twenty-six per cent of transatlantic
charter passengers, United States certificated passenger carriers for ten
per cent, and European carriers for sixty-three per cent. Secondly, continuation of the Board's restrictive regulation preventing travel agents
from chartering aircraft for use in connection with all-expense tours
organized and promoted by these agents will serve to hold down charter
traffic by supplementals
Perhaps of still greater importance, however,
is the fact that for most of the traveling public, chartering is not a satisfactory substitute for regular service, with its superior convenience and
flexibility. Finally, it can hardly be doubted that really serious inroads on
regular airline traffic by independent charters would be met by such
actions as were deemed necessary by governments to protect their flag
carriers.
VI. LONG-RUN POLICY OBJECTIVES

It has been concluded that no very great improvement in rates or ratemaking seems possible without a change in the basic attitudes of govern" Ibid., Appendix A, p. 9.
5" Ibid., Appendix A, p. 5.
51 Ibid., Appendix A, p. 6.
5' Ibid., Appendix A, title page.
"9The importance attributed by the examiner to this restriction is indicated by the following quotation from the Board's Opinion (Ibid., Appendix A, p. 31): "All-expense tour charters,
the examiner concluded, would have much more drastic diversionary effects than would split
charter authority, exposing to diversion the substantial volume of historical all-expense tour
business carried by Pan American and TWA (13% of its economy fare passengers in the case
of Pan American, $12.5 million 1961 revenues for TWA). Since a large part of such traffic is
promoted and sold by travel agents, agents offering all-expense group tours on flights they have
committed themselves to charter will logically channel their group tour traffic to such charter
flights in order to preserve their investment in organization and promotion."
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ments. Is there any reason to believe that such a change might take place
in the foreseeable future? As far as is known to this writer, there is no
overt evidence to this effect at present. Nevertheless, there are some important considerations which lead to the belief that such a change is not
entirely out of the question.
First, it is evidently not only United States interests which may be
injured when reductions in international rates and fares are delayed and
diminished. For example, the real value of the United States tourist trade
to major European nations is very great indeed; any significant curtailment of this traffic is a heavy price for them to pay for the maintenance
of high-cost airline service under the national flag.
Second, most if not all major international air services have become
capable of self-support under efficient operation. When the institutions
which at present govern international air transportation were developed,
immediately after the Second World War, the almost universal need for
subsidy militated against the adoption of liberal competitive principles.
Where each competitor had access to the public purse on a cost-plus basis,
it was not to be expected that competition would work toward an acceptable economic equilibrium, and concerted price determination was a
not illogical reflection of the need for competitive restraint. Because of
technological progress, this reason for restraint is now disappearing, though
it may reappear at any time if unwise governmental decisions as to routes,
equipment, and the like force airlines to operate at a loss. United States
flag international services have been free of direct subsidy since the late
1950s. Recent efforts by European carriers to reduce costs have in at
least one instance (SAS) been notably successful, and further progress
may be expected if the consortium known as Air Union becomes a means
of consolidating all or some of the operations of its members." Where a
satisfactory supply of commercial air transportation is available on a
self-sufficient basis, it is no longer reasonable for any nation to justify
the subsidization of its flag carrier on grounds of "the needs of commerce."
Third, the technology of warfare has changed to such an extent that
it is also no longer possible to rationalize governmental maintenance of
a flag carrier as a means of partial support for equipment needed for
military use.
Fourth, it is perhaps worth suggesting that the prestige value of a national flag carrier is not what it used to be, because of general public
familiarity with long-distance air transportation under many flags for a
period of years.
If there is some reason to hope for the development of governmental
attitudes which do not necessarily identify national interest with the
interest of the carriers of each nation, then attention can be fruitfully
given to the development of a less restrictive institutional framework for
international air transportation. Though the rate-making machinery of
IATA has been the vehicle rather than the cause of the obstruction of
beneficial rate initiatives in the past, the machinery itself would obviously
offer an opportunity for harmful collusion among the carriers even in the
60

The four original prospective members of this consortium (Air France, Alitalia, Sabena, and

Lufthansa) have recently been joined by KLM and Luxair (of Luxembourg). According to
Aviation Week (March 16, 1964), the entry of these two carriers "has largely offset whatever
progress had been made toward Air Union, for now the knotty question of profit sharing must be
renegotiated."

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

absence of governmental protectionism. Without this protectionism, it
should not be impossible to develop a regime similar to that prevailing
in United States domestic air transport-i.e., traffic conferences which deal
successfully with matters on which cooperation among carriers is economically desirable, under the supervision of a regulatory body (here, the
CAB) but do not engage in concerted pricing. In the international field,
supervision would of course have to be carried on through cooperation
among various governments, and in this context full rate authority for
the Board would probably be a necessary instrument. To be acceptable to
the United States, and to accomplish maximum benefit for all concerned,
any cooperative regulatory scheme would have to avoid supporting internal
subsidization within carrier route systems, such as the utilization of excessive profits earned in the transatlantic tourist market to finance lowdensity politically-motivated routes elsewhere."' The liberalization of controls over other aspects of international air transportation, such as landing

rights and carrying capacity, would be a logical and necessary concomitant
of reform in rate-making.

Such a program with respect to major international routes need not,
of course, conflict with the desires of nations, new and old, to reserve, for

political reasons, their domestic air transport markets to carriers of their
own nationality. Similarly, no conflict would necessarily exist between

this program and the reservation of regional air traffic for local carriers
as broader communities and federations develop in the various continents
of the world. Therefore, it seems not unreasonable to believe that a plan
for liberalization need not ultimately founder on the rocks of old or new
nationalisms."5

6' In a speech before the Wings Club in New York on January 22, 1964, CAB Chairman
Boyd indicated the position of the United States as follows: "Nor are we willing or content to
have the traveler across the North Atlantic pay to subsidize the national-interest routes of a
country in some other area of the world. That feeling is just as strong for the U.S. carrier as
it is for the foreign flag carrier. We have an international air transport policy in this country
that was approved by the President. That policy states that national-interest routes should be
paid for by the government. We believe this. We think this should be the case with our carriers
and with everybody else's carriers."
62 A more pessimistic view, however, was expressed by CAB Chairman Boyd in the speech
supra note 61: "In the international area, in terms of traffic rights and operations, I think that
the United States flag carriers are in for a pretty rough time. The desire to restrict the competition is very strong. It's very strong among what are called the underdeveloped countries. It is
very strong among the underdeveloped airlines. Any airline that is operating in competition with
Pan American and TWA and not making as much as they are is an underdeveloped airline in its
own view. . . .
"We have situations also where a number of countries whose carriers are doing well want
to do better. The way they feel they can do better is to put the squeeze on our carriers and
then we . . . will be reasonable. In some cases this is going to work. It's unfortunate but this is
what happens . . . our carriers have got the benefit of something that few others have, and that
is excellent management. This means dollars and cents. It is not going to solve the problems with
the governments and with the other carriers who are trying to get bigger by cutting us down.
I don't think we should feel that there is any crisis involved. I think this is going to be a way of
life for United States international aviation for the foreseeable future."

